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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-3104 
_____________ 
 
MISTERNOVO BAMACA-CIFUENTES; 
BYRON DONALDO BAMACA-BAUTISTA; 
ABNER ABDIEL BAMACA-BAUTISTA, 
                                                           Petitioners 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                        Respondent 
_____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Final Order 
Of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Nos. A070-673-932, A097-973-615, A097-761-129) 
Immigration Judge: Steven A. Morley 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
February 6, 2017 
____________ 
 
Before: McKEE, COWEN and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: August 29, 2017) 
_____________________ 
 
Theodore J. Murphy, Esq. 
Murphy Law Firm 
320 North High Street 
West Chester, PA 19380 
 
Attorney for Petitioners 
 
Todd J. Cochran, Esq. 
United States Department of Justice 
2 
 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
 
Attorneys for Respondent 
 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Petitioners ask us to decide if the Board of Immigration 
Appeals abused its discretion by denying an untimely motion 
to reopen removal proceedings arising from a request for 
protection under the U.N.’s Convention Against Torture or 
“CAT.” Their petition requires us to determine if the time bar 
contained in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) applies to motions to reopen 
based on a request for withholding of removal under the CAT. 
We have previously held that the time limitation does apply to 
these motions to reopen, but we have only done so in a non-
precedential opinion that is not binding on this court. We now 
take the opportunity to affirm that principle in this precedential 
opinion. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we will hold 
that the procedural requirements in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) apply 
with equal force to motions to reopen removal proceedings 
involving protection under the CAT. We will therefore deny 
this petition for review.  
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Misternovo Bamaca-Cifuentes and his sons, Byron 
Donaldo Bamaca-Bautista and Abner Abdiel Bamaca-
Bautista1 are natives and citizens of Guatemala who first 
entered the United States in 1990, 1998, and 2004, 
respectively.2 In 1999, Misternovo filed an application for 
suspension of deportation or special rule cancellation of 
removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central 
American Relief Act (NACARA) that listed his sons as 
derivatives.3 The United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services refused to grant the NACARA application and 
referred the petition to an Immigration Judge for adjudication. 
 
In May 2008, the Department of Homeland Security 
initiated removal proceedings against Misternovo and his two 
sons. They were charged with removability as aliens who were 
in the United States without being admitted or paroled, under 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).4 At a hearing before the 
Immigration Judge, Misternovo admitted the allegations 
contained in the Notices to Appeal, and the Immigration Judge 
ruled that Petitioners were therefore removable as charged. 
 
Later, in January 2012, Misternovo’s NACARA 
application received a full merits hearing before an 
                                              
1 In order to avoid confusion, we refer to the three petitioners 
by their first names.  
2 Misternovo left the United States in October 1996, after his 
wife was deported. He then returned in early 1997.  
3 Misternovo also filed an application for asylum in 1993, 
alleging persecution based on claimed membership in a 
particular social group—specifically, the civil patrol in 
Guatemala—but he later withdrew that application in January 
2012.  
4 DHS later added an additional charge of inadmissibility 
against Abner, alleging that he was an alien who had been 
convicted of, or who admitted committing the essential 
elements of, a crime involving moral turpitude, pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). In 2007, Abner was convicted of 
theft and conspiracy in the third degree, in violation of the 
Delaware Criminal Code.   
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Immigration Judge.5 The Immigration Judge denied the 
NACARA application, holding that Misternovo had failed to 
establish that he had timely registered for benefits pursuant to 
the American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh settlement 
agreement;6 consequently, Petitioners were ordered removed 
to Guatemala. Petitioners thereafter timely appealed, but the 
appeal was dismissed by the Board on May 29, 2013. The BIA 
concluded that the IJ had properly denied Misternovo’s 
NACARA application. Petitioners did not seek review of that 
Board decision. 
 
More than two years later, on December 21, 2015, 
Petitioners filed a motion to reopen with the Board based on 
changed country conditions in Guatemala. DHS opposed the 
motion and the Board denied it on June 14, 2016. The Board 
found that Petitioners had “not demonstrated a material change 
in country conditions since the time they last appeared before 
the Immigration Judge.”7 This timely petition for review 
followed.  
 
III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The Board of Immigration Appeals had jurisdiction 
over Petitioners’ motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. §§ 
1003.1(b)(3), 1003.2(a), and 1240.15. We have jurisdiction to 
                                              
5 Misternovo also withdrew his application for asylum at this 
time. 
6 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991). Under the terms of what 
has come to be known as the “ABC settlement agreement,” 
eligible Guatemalans and Salvadorans are entitled to certain 
immigration benefits. In order to qualify for these benefits, a 
Guatemalan must have (1) been physically present in the U.S. 
before September 19, 1990 and (2) sent in an ABC 
registration form by December 31, 1999. See U.S. Citizenship 
& Immigration Servs., American Baptist Churches v. 
Thornburgh (ABC) Settlement Agreement, 
https://www.uscis.gov/laws/legal-settlement-
notices/american-baptist-churches-v-thornburgh-abc-
settlement-agreement (last visited Aug. 10, 2017). In this 
case, the IJ found that Misternovo had failed to comply with 
the registration requirement. 
7 App. at 4. 
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review the Board’s final orders of removal under Section 
242(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(1). “We review the denial of a motion to reopen for 
abuse of discretion and may reverse only if the denial is 
arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”8   
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
It is clear from the unambiguous text of 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.2(c) that the time and number restrictions in that 
regulation apply to all motions to reopen removal proceedings, 
regardless of the motion’s underlying basis for relief: 
. . . an alien may file only one motion to reopen 
removal proceedings (whether before the Board 
or the Immigration Judge) and that motion must 
be filed no later than 90 days after the date on 
which the final administrative decision was 
rendered in the proceeding sought to be 
reopened.9 
 
The next section of the regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3), 
outlines exceptions to the time and number restrictions 
articulated in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The section applicable 
here is 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), which provides that: 
The time and numerical limitations set forth in 
paragraph (c)(2) of this section shall not apply to 
a motion to reopen proceedings. . . . To apply or 
reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation 
based on changed circumstances arising in the 
country of nationality or in the country to which 
deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is 
material and was not available and could not 
have been discovered or presented at the 
previous hearing.10 
                                              
8 Contreras v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 665 F.3d 578, 583 (3d Cir. 
2012) (citing Shardar v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 503 F.3d 308, 
311–12 (3d Cir. 2007)). 
9 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). 
10 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). This regulation echoes the 
language of the INA, which states: 
There is no time limit on the filing of a motion 
to reopen if the basis of the motion is to apply 
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Thus, the 90-day time bar (and restriction to file only one 
motion) will be waived for motions to reopen that (1) apply or 
reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation that are (2) 
based on changed country conditions and (3) supported by 
material evidence unavailable at the previous hearing. This 
changed-circumstances regulation effectively creates a 
“procedural hurdle that must be overcome before an untimely 
motion to reopen may be considered.”11 
 
Despite these procedural hurdles, Petitioners claim that 
the Board abused its discretion “by not conducting a thorough 
analysis of any of Petitioners’ evidence that support their 
claims for [relief pursuant to the] CAT.”12 Thus, Petitioners 
imply that the Board, when evaluating their untimely motion 
to reopen, should have ignored the time bar of 8 C.F.R. §1003.2 
and its exceptions, and proceeded directly to the merits of the 
underlying CAT claim. This implication, however, is not 
“supported by the logic of our precedents and by holdings of 
our sister circuits.” 13 
 
As we noted at the outset, we have already concluded in 
a non-precedential opinion that 8 C.F.R. §1003.2’s time bar 
applies to motions to reopen removal proceedings seeking 
withholding of removal under the CAT.  In Thomas v. Attorney 
                                              
for [asylum or withholding of removal] and is 
based on changed country conditions arising in 
the country of nationality or the country to 
which removal has been ordered, if such 
evidence is material and was not available and 
would not have been discovered or presented at 
the previous hearing. 
8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). 
11 Thomas v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 308 F. App’x 587, 593 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (citing Shardar, 503 F.3d at 314). 
12 Petitioners’ Br. at 12. 
13 Go v. Holder, 744 F.3d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 2014). In 
addition, the First Circuit has applied 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) to 
CAT claims. Gasparian v. Holder, 700 F.3d 611, 613 (1st 
Cir. 2012) (holding that new evidence of changed conditions 
failed to establish a prima facie case of claims for asylum, 
withholding of removal, or CAT relief). 
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General, we applied the time and number limitations of 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) to a motion to reopen removal proceedings 
involving relief under the CAT that was based on changed 
country conditions.14 The panel’s reasoning denying that 
motion is persuasive, and we adopt our colleagues’ analysis in 
this precedential opinion.  We also note that the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has correctly concluded in Go v. 
Holder that “it appears that every circuit to have considered the 
question [of whether 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) applies to motions 
to reopen to seek protection under the CAT] has concluded that 
it does.”15  
 
Accordingly, we must now determine whether the 
Board erred in relying on 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) to reject 
Petitioners’ “Motion to Reopen Removal Proceedings Based 
on Changed Country Conditions.”16 If the Board correctly 
concluded that (1) the Petitioners’ motion to reopen was 
untimely, and (2) the untimely motion did not meet the 
changed country conditions exception, then the Board was 
procedurally barred from examining the underlying merits of 
any of Petitioners’ claims, including their claim for 
withholding of removal under the CAT. Thus, in order to 
resolve Petitioners’ appeal, we must determine whether these 
two conditions were met. 
 
We begin with the timeliness of Petitioners’ motion to 
reopen. Petitioners filed their motion to reopen on December 
21, 2015, well past 90 days after the Board’s “final 
administrative decision” on May 29, 2013.17 Though the Board 
did not explicitly state that Petitioners’ motion was untimely, 
its consideration of the changed country conditions exception 
                                              
14 308 F. App’x at 591.   
15 Go, 744 F.3d at 608–09 (collecting unpublished opinions 
from the Second, Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits)).   
16 App. at 19. 
17 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.39. The 
government repeatedly characterizes December 21, 2015 as 
being “nearly four years” after May 29, 2013.  Respondent’s 
Br. at 2, 6, 13. Though this is plainly wrong, it does not 
change the fact that the 90 days had elapsed well before 
Petitioners filed their motion to reopen. 
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necessarily implies this finding.18 The Board clearly did not err 
in this finding, as the untimely nature of the petition is obvious.  
 
We must next examine whether the Board erred in 
concluding that Petitioner did not meet the changed country 
conditions exception. As explained above, we can only reverse 
the Board’s conclusion that the motion did not meet the 
changed country conditions exception if that decision were 
“arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” 19  It is clear on this 
record that the decision was not arbitrary, irrational or contrary 
to law.  
 
To meet the changed country conditions exception, 
Petitioners had to prove changed conditions in Guatemala by 
providing evidence that (1) is material, and (2) “was not 
available and could not have been discovered or presented at 
the previous hearing.”20 The Board found that Petitioners could 
not satisfy either prong. In reviewing the motion to reopen, the 
Board noted that Petitioners provided “applications for asylum, 
United States government reports and non-governmental 
reports relating to country conditions in Guatemala; media 
reports covering Guatemala; an affidavit prepared by 
[Misternovo]; and, letters from persons in Guatemala advising 
of the situation there and the changes since [Petitioners] left 23 
years ago.”21 Because Petitioners’ motion did “not make clear 
the exact onset of the changed country conditions underlying 
the current request for relief,” the Board considered evidence 
submitted that postdated January 31, 2012—the date of 
Petitioners’ hearing before the Immigration Judge.22 After 
review of Petitioners’ evidence, the Board concluded that 
Petitioners failed to demonstrate a material change in country 
                                              
18 App. at 3 (“We will consider the respondents’ motion based 
upon the assertion of changed country conditions in the 
respondents’ county of nationality and the evidence that has 
been submitted in support thereof that postdates the 
respondents’ hearing before the Immigration Judge.”). 
19 Contreras, 665 F.3d at 583. 
20 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). 
21 App. at 3. 
22 App. at 3–4 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 965 (BIA 
1997)). 
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conditions since that date, and therefore refused to reopen the 
proceedings.23   
 
A review of the evidence submitted confirms that it 
largely dealt with ongoing problems in Guatemala, and did not 
provide a basis for finding that there was a material change in 
conditions there after January 2012.24 Because the Board’s 
decision is supported by the evidence, it cannot be 
characterized as arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law. Thus, 
the Board’s failure to address Petitioners’ underlying claims 
for protection under the CAT was not an abuse of discretion.25 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for 
review.  
                                              
23 App. at 4. 
24 Indeed, Petitioners’ evidence summaries note that some of 
Guatemala’s street gangs “have been in operation for 
decades,” discuss the “Continued Corruption and Government 
Collusion with Criminal Organizations,” and detail the 
ongoing repercussions of the Guatemalan civil war that lasted 
from 1960–1996.  App. at. 26, 30, 94–95. 
25 Shardar, 503 F.3d at 314–15. 
